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This paper revisits the question of whether global welfare is 
higher under a uniform world-wide system of pharmaceutical product 
patents or with international rules allowing low-income nations to 
free-ride on the discoveries of firms in rich nations.  Key 
variables include the extent to which free-riding reduces the 
discovery of new drugs, the rent potential of rich as compared to 
poor nations, the ratio of the marginal utility of income in poor 
as compared to rich nations, and the competitive environment within 
which R&D decisions are made.  Global welfare is found to be higher 
with free-riding over plausible discovery impairment and income 
utility combinations, especially when rent-seeking behavior leads 
to an expansion of R&D outlays exhausting appropriable rents.  
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The Uruguay Round TRIPS
1 provisions requiring the extension of 
first-world patent protection standards to third world nations, 
including especially the mandate that patents be granted on 
pharmaceutical products, have been enormously controversial.  The 
ensuing debate led, among other things, to a decision at the Doha 
WTO conference to delay the requirement that the least-developed 
nations offer pharmaceutical product patents by at least a decade, 
to the year 2016.  
 
It is reasonably well established in the economic literature 
that, especially in a world of AIDS and resistant tuberculosis 
epidemics, low-income nations enjoy higher economic welfare when 
they can free-ride on pharmaceutical innovations made and patented 
in the first world than when they must pay monopolistic prices for 
the newest and most effective drugs.
2  Less settled is the question 
of whether total world welfare is higher under uniform 
pharmaceutical patent standards or with free-riding.  This paper 
provides what I believe are some fresh insights into the global 
welfare problem. 
 
                     
*Professor emeritus, Harvard University; lecturer, Princeton 
University; and visiting scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia. 
 
     1.  Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. 
     2.  See e.g. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
(2002), Maskus (2000, Chapter 5), and Scherer and Watal (2002).  
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A foundation is laid by revisiting diagrams used in my 1996 
analysis of the pharmaceutical patent question,
3 which in turn was 
based in part upon an analysis by Alan Deardorff (1990, 1992).  
Figure 1 views the welfare implications from the perspective of an 
LDC, whose demand curve for a particular drug is given by D.  If 
the LDC grants patents, the drug is assumed to be sold at the 
monopoly profit-maximizing price OPM. In that case, rectangle H 
measures the producers' surplus realized by the drug's patent 
holder, presumably, a multinational company, and consumers' surplus 
triangle B is realized by the citizens of the LDC. If however 
patents are not granted and the drug is supplied to the LDC's 
citizens competitively (a strong assumption not questioned here), 
the citizens of the LDC consume more at the lower price OPC and gain 
the much larger consumers' surplus of B + H + A.  Given the 
linearity of demand and cost assumed in my example, B + H + A is 
four times as large as consumers' surplus B under monopoly. I argue 
that the LDC is better off only if granting patent rights increases 
the development and supply of comparable new drugs by at least 
three times. 
 
Figure 2 asks whether such an increase in the number of new 
drugs is likely. Extending concepts originally articulated by 
William Nordhaus (1969), the solid line RD(NCE) shows how the 
number of new chemical entities developed per year (vertical axis) 
varies with the amount spent on research and development 
(horizontal axis).  Broken lines Q1 and Q2 show how quasi-rents 
appropriated by innovators (horizontal axis) vary with the number 
of new chemical entities marketed.  Q2 is shifted to the right by 20 
percent relative to Q1 to reflect my assumption that extending 
patent protection to LDCs would increase rents by 20 percent, or 
low-income nations' approximate share of world GDP.  Given this and 
the profit maximization assumptions made by Nordhaus, which I 
question in my book and will question later but accept tentatively, 
the equilibrium number of new chemical entities is found by 
maximizing the horizontal distance between RD(NCE) and a quasi-rent 
function, leading to the development of 15 new chemical entities if 
LDCs do not offer patent rights and roughly 18 if they do.  The 
change falls far short of the three-fold increase required to make 
the LDC whole in granting patents. 
 
Analyzing the global welfare question requires a more complex 
model.  The one presented here is as lean as possible, attempting 
to focus on three key variables:  the relative increase in 
producer's surplus that can be achieved through patented 
pharmaceutical sales in the third world, the number of additional 
pharmaceutical products (each assumed tentatively to have identical 
demand functions), and -- a key variable that cannot be ignored in 
comparative welfare analyses -- the average difference in the 
marginal utility of income for third world as compared to first 
                     
     3.  Scherer (1996, Chapter 9).  
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world consumers.  Another variable will be held constant for the 
sake of simplicity -- the number of consumers in the third world 
relative to the number in the first world.  The relevant data 
suggest setting the first- and third-world population shares at S1 = 
S3 = 0.5. 
Figures 3(a) and 3(b), which are conceptually identical to 
demand curves used by Jayashree Watal and myself to illustrate the 
benefits of Ramsey-Baumol-Bradford discrimination for the pricing 
of pharmaceutical products in the first and third worlds,
4 assume 
that at a zero prices, the same number of prescriptions (13.5 
million) would be demanded monthly in the first world and in the 
third world.
5  However, income effects cause the demand function to 
be flatter in poor nations than in rich nations.  Marginal cost is 
assumed to be $3 per Rx.  As the diagram is drawn, a firm enjoying 
patent protection in both the rich and poor nations will set a 
price of about $16.50 per Rx in the rich countries, realizing a 
contribution to profits and the recoupment of R&D costs (quasi-
rent) of roughly $91 million per month there.  In the poor nations 
its price will be $6.50, and its contribution to profits will be 
approximately $18.4 million, or roughly 20 percent of first-world 
profits.  The 20 percent value mimics the assumption in Figure 2.   
To make the numbers simpler and more memorable, we recalibrate 
the rich-nation producer's surplus to be 100.  Using the welfare 
gain notation of Figure 1, and assuming linearity of demand 
functions, the tally of surpluses per new product for these two 
cases, assuming patent protection in both jurisdictions, is as 
follows: 
                               Rich Nations     Poor Nations 
 
H   Producer's surplus        100              20 
     B   Consumers' surplus         50              10 
 
 
The producer's surplus in poor nations, it should be noted, 
presumably accrues to rich-nation shareholders of multinational 
corporations.  If on the other hand the poor nations offer no 
patent protection and receive at competitive prices pharmaceutical 
products that would be developed in any event in response to rich 
nation consumers' demand, the welfare gain to poor nation consumers 
is H + B + A = 40 and producers forego a surplus of 20. 
 
A common assumption in benefit/cost analysis is that one 
party's surplus is equivalent to another party's surplus.  To 
accept that assumption would be to miss much of what the debate 
over pharmaceutical product patent rights in the third world is all 
                     
     4.  Watal and Scherer (2002), and Scherer and Watal 
(forthcoming). 
     5.  The demand equation is P = 30 - 2Q for the rich nations 
and P = 10 - 0.667 Q for the poor nations.  
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about. Roughly half of the world's population live in nations where 
income per capita is only one-tenth that of the United States or 
western Europe.  If one accepts the notion dating back at least to 
Alfred Marshall that "the richer a man becomes the less is the 
marginal utility of money to him,"
6 one needs to assign greater 
weight to the benefits realized by poor nation citizens than to 
those of rich nation inhabitants.  I shall do this through the 
weighting factor U, which measures the ratio of the marginal 
utility of income for the median poor nation inhabitant to that of 
the median rich nation citizen.
7  
 
We must now tally the appropriately weighted sum of surplus 
for two different intellectual property regimes:  Case 1, in which 
pharmaceutical products receive full patent protection in all 
nations, and Case 2, in which patent rights are only conferred in 
the first world and LDCs free-ride on the inventions made in the 
first world.
8  Plainly, with larger producer rents in Case 1, there 
will be more inventions, as implied by Figure 2.  How many more 
successful new chemical entities there are is a key variable.  We 
assume in base Case 1 that with worldwide patent rights, the number 
of new chemical entities, each assumed to have the same demand 
characteristics, approved and marketed each year is 25.  In Case 2, 
the number is a variable N whose value is less than 25. 
 
The question is, over what configurations of variables U and N 
is worldwide welfare higher under Case 1, and when is it higher 
under Case 2?  Disaggregating the accounts so that the benefits in 
the first world are presented in the first set of brackets, the 
                     
     6.  Marshall (1948), p. 96.  An even older source is the 
Gospel according to Mark 12: 41-43. 
     7.  When new drug products must be imported in bulk or 
finished form, U might alternatively or in addition reflect the 
higher Lagrangian multiplier on foreign exchange budgets in less 
affluent nations. 
     8.  We ignore welfare increments following the expiration of 
patents, which are likely to be heavily discounted.  Their 
increase is slightly greater in Case 1 than in Case 2.  
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producer's surpluses realized by first world firms in third world 
markets in the second set of brackets, and benefits to third world 
consumers in the third set of brackets, and using the notation of 
Figure 1, the accounting is as follows: 
 
Case 1: [25S1 (B1+H1)] + [25S3 H3] + [25S3 B3U] = 1875 + 250 + 125U. 
 
Case 2: [N S1 (B1+H1)] + [0]  + [N S3 (A3+B3+H3) U] = 75 N + 20 N U. 
 
  When these two equations are set equal, global welfare is 
identical under either policy; equality identifies the breakeven 
case.  The solid line marked "Nordhaus, Poor = 20%" in Figure 4 
shows the breakeven line for the assumptions accepted thus far. 
Variable pairs above (north of) the solid line show situations in 
which global welfare is higher under Case 2, i.e., with LDC free-
riding.  If extending patent protection world-wide leads to a loss 
of only one NCE per year relative to the base case, global welfare 
is maximized even if the marginal utility of income is the same for 
poor as compared to rich nation citizens.  But if the sacrifice 
from eliminating 20 percent of rich-nation rents is 20 percent of 
the potential or base case NCEs, i.e., five, global welfare is 
higher if the utility of income in the third world exceeds that of 
the first world by more than a factor of 2.27.  With plausible 
diminishing returns in the inducement of NCEs as the quasi-rent 
potential increases (see Figure 2), free-riding becomes globally 
optimal with utility differentials smaller than 2.27.  A key 
implication is that strong value judgments -- on the magnitude of 
that differential -- are unavoidable in determining which policy is 
globally optimal. 
 
It might be asserted that less-developed nations have more 
than 20 percent of wealthy nations' pharmaceutical rent potential.
9 
 Suppose the rent potential is 40 percent rather than 20 percent -- 
e.g., because the poor nation demand curve's vertical intercept is 
raised to 15 instead of 10.  Then holding the rich nation quasi-
rent potential constant at 100, consumers' surplus in Case 1 rises 
to 20 for the poor nation and so also does avoided deadweight loss 
triangle A in Figure 1.  The higher surpluses in LDCs shift the 
breakeven curve downward (dotted line in Figure 2), increasing the 
likelihood that free-riding is globally optimal for any given 
retardation of new chemical entity development.  To be sure, 
sacrifice of larger potential quasi-rents due to free-riding makes 
it likely that the number of new chemical entities will also be 
smaller than in the 20 percent scenario.  But again, there are 
likely to be diminishing marginal returns, as shown in Figure 2.  
With a 28 percent diminution to 18 NCEs, breakeven occurs when the 
                     
     9.  This criticism of my 1996 assumptions is advanced in 
Sykes (2002).  
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income utility ratio is 1.77.  With a 36 percent diminution to N = 
16, breakeven occurs with an income utility ratio of 2.38. 
 
In addition to the customary reluctance of economists to make 
the kind of income utility comparisons I have advanced, there are 
two likely criticisms of this model. 
 
One questions whether the producer's surplus rectangles H in 
my model are in fact clear-cut welfare gains.  Those surpluses are 
a stimulus to investment in research, development, and testing.  
For a complete welfare accounting, the costs of R&D must be 
subtracted from the quasi-rents, assumed to be discounted to 
present value at the same benchmark date.  My service as chair of 
the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment advisory committee for its 
study of pharmaceutical profits and R&D in the early 1990s led me 
to wonder how quasi-rent margins in the pharmaceutical industry can 
be so high, stimulating R&D spending, while correctly computed 
returns on industry investment exceed risk-adjusted norms by only 
one or two percentage points on average.
10  I have gradually come to 
the realization that the best characterization of the industry's 
behavior is a full rent-seeking model.  That is, rising quasi-rent 
potentials are almost fully exhausted by the competitive escalation 
of costs -- for R&D, marketing, and implicit returns on R&D 
investment -- leaving only a small pure surplus for the 
stockholders of pharmaceutical companies.
11  One implication of this 
alternative behavioral model is that industry equilibrium occurs at 
points R1 and R2 rather than W and Y in Figure 2, and so, depending 
upon the strength of the diminishing returns phenomenon, there are 
far more new products forthcoming in a given year.  Another 
implication follows from the largely forgotten insights advanced in 
a debate two decades ago, showing that when innovators are 
competing rent-seekers rather than secure Nordhaus-type profit 




In the model presented here, the implication is that the H 
rectangles cannot be counted as social welfare gains.  Thus, the 
comparison of gains when LDC quasi-rent potential is 20 percent of 
                     
     10.  See U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1993). 
     11.  For empirical support, see Scherer (2001). 
     12.  McFetridge and Rafiquzzaman (1986), with a comment by 
Roger Beck.  
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the rich nation potential is altered to:   
 
 
Case 1:  [25 S1 (B1)] + [0] + [25 S3 B3 U] = 625 + 125 U. 
 
Case 2:  [N  S1 (B1)] + [0] + [N S3 (A3+B3+H3) U] = 25 N + 20 N U. 
 
With this change of assumptions, the breakeven curves (labeled 
"Rent-Seeking" in Figure 4) are shifted dramatically toward the 
origin. If the loss of LDC quasi-rent potential amounting to 20 
percent of rich-nation rents in Case 2 implies a 40 percent 
reduction in the number of new products to 15 per year, global 
welfare (with breakeven given by the dot-dash line) is higher under 
free-riding if the ratio of LDC to rich nation income utility 
exceeds 1.43.  If the reduction in the number of new products is 
only eight out of 25 (i.e., 32 percent), global welfare is higher 
under free-riding if the ratio of LDC to rich nation income utility 
exceeds 0.93!  With 40 percent LDC rent potentials relative to 
those of the high-income nations, the downward shift of the 
breakeven curve (dashed line) is even greater, so that global 
welfare is maximized under free-riding even if the number of NCEs 
falls by half and no distinction is made between the income utility 
of rich and poor consumers.  And these rent-seeking assumptions, I 
am convinced, are more realistic than the assumption that 
producer's surplus is a pure social gain, accepted in my initial 
model. If one believes that competitive rent seeking dissipates 
producers' surpluses, free-riding policies become all the more 
attractive, even from a global standpoint. 
 
Another vulnerable point in the model presented here is the 
assumption that each product has the same demand curve and hence 
the same constellation of surpluses.  This is at odds with reality 
in pharmaceuticals and indeed in virtually every field of 
technological innovation.  The distribution of returns to 
innovation is highly skew.  Blockbuster innovations always capture 




It might be argued that consumers in less-developed countries 
will benefit because there are vast numbers of them, they suffer 
from diseases not prevalent in the rich nations, and (arguably) the 
granting of patent rights will induce pharmaceutical companies 
(presumably, multinational pharmaceutical companies) to do research 
they would otherwise not undertake on diseases found mainly in poor 
nations, discovering new drugs with blockbuster potential.  This is 
indeed the strongest argument for extending pharmaceutical product 
patent rights throughout the world.  But it is not conclusive for 
four reasons. 
                     
     13. See Scherer, Harhoff, and Kukies (2000).  
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First, in the nations where the so-called "tropical diseases" 
abound, most potential consumers are very poor, with annual incomes 
measured in the low hundreds of dollars.  Those nations also tend 
to have at best primitive public health systems, and most drugs 
must be purchased with consumers' own funds, for which a myriad of 
life-sustaining uses compete.  In other words, demand functions are 
pressed even closer to marginal cost functions than implied in 
Figure 3(b).  Even when they are aggregated over hundreds of 
millions of consumers, it is not clear that there are quasi-rent 
potentials anywhere near those associated with medicines targeted 
toward coronary problems, common cancers, gastritis, depression, 
and inadequate sexual function in rich nations.  If the quasi-rent 
potential is weak, not much rent-seeking research and testing will 
be induced. 
 
Second, uncertainty abounds in predicting during R&D phases 
how large the market for a particular therapeutic molecule will be. 
Molecules often turn out to have therapeutic uses quite different 
from those initially contemplated.  Viagra is an example of such 
serendipitous discovery, as was the discovery that Bayer's 
praziquantil is effective against schistosomiasis.  And at the 
clinical testing stage, it remains uncertain what fraction of a 
target audience will respond favorably to the drug's use.  Even as 
simple a matter as the way the drug is introduced into the body -- 
e.g., injection, three-per-day oral delivery, or once-per-week time 
release delivery -- can significantly affect the extent of use in 
less-developed nations, where systematic care by nurses or 
physicians is the exception rather than the rule.  Ex ante, 
therefore, the expected distribution of returns from innovation 
entails more uniformity of quasi-rents than it does after full 
technological and marketing experience has been accumulated.
14 
  
Third, interest in developing new tropical disease cures may 
be keener en situ than in pharmaceutical laboratories thousands of 
miles away from the disease locus.  But in the nations most 
afflicted by tropical diseases, the technological capabilities 
needed to do state-of-the-art research and product development are 
scarce.  Advancing from incentive to innovation is not automatic.  
Research by Sandy Weisburst and mentored by me showed, for example, 
that Italy, with a vibrant generic drug industry, did not achieve 
any significant increase in the discovery of innovative drugs 
during the first decade after the Italian Supreme Court mandated 
                     
     14.  This is shown in simulations by Scherer, Harhoff, and 
Kukies (2000).  
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the issue of pharmaceutical product patents.
15 
 
                     
     15.  Weisburst and Scherer (1995).  See also Challu (1995). 
If there are exceptions to the Italian experience, India, 
having replaced Italy as the world's leading generic drug source, 
is the most likely candidate.  But this raises my fourth caveat.  
Jean O. Lanjouw (1997) has conducted preliminary interviews on the 
probable response of Indian pharmaceutical firms to a new regime in 
which pharmaceutical product patents can be received in India.  The 
first results suggest that the Indian firms are more interested in 
developing new drugs that will be blockbusters in the first world 
than in targeting tropical disease remedies.  This may change.  But 
one has reason to doubt whether the extension of patent protection 
will elicit large investments in third world diseases. 
 
It is nevertheless possible that multinational pharmaceutical 
companies will reorient their R&D portfolios to place more emphasis 
on third world diseases.  The Uruguay Round intellectual property 
agreements have now been a reality for eight years, but during this 
period, I have seen little evidence of such changes.  I confess 
that I have not made a systematic search into the question.  One 
should certainly be undertaken. 
 
In the meantime, I believe, an opportunity has been lost.  The 
debate over drug patent rights under TRIPS would have provided an 
ideal opportunity for someone like Kofi Annan to say to the 
multinational pharmaceutical companies, "We will support your 
demand for strong patent rights throughout the world if you will 
commit 20 percent of your research and development budgets to 
diseases specific to less-developed nations."  The multinational 
pharmaceutical companies made an analogous commitment in persuading 
Canada to abandon its vigorously enforced drug patent compulsory 
licensing laws.  As a quid pro quo, the pharmaceutical companies 
agreed to locate in Canada R&D activities proportional to Canada's 
share of the companies' drug sales.  If such a commitment were 
forthcoming, my fourth caveat would be less persuasive. 
  
  10 
To sum up, my analysis reveals that global welfare is 
maximized by letting low-income nations free-ride on the patented 
inventions of first-world nations over a wide range of negative new 
product development impacts if one accepts the reasonable premise 
that the marginal utility of income is appreciably higher in poor 
nations than in rich nations.  The Doha round of negotiations 
appears to have gravitated toward a proper solution, deferring 
implementation of the TRIPS provisions on pharmaceuticals in the 
least-developed nations for a considerable period.
16  In the 
interim, we will be able to observe the response of pharmaceutical 
companies to the limited grants of exclusivity already implemented 
under the Treaty of Marrakech.  And there will be time for 
commitments to be extracted that could change the conditions under 
which tropical medicines are supplied and increase the relative 
welfare gains from world-wide uniformity of pharmaceutical patent 
policies. 
                     
     16.  The U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
(2002, p. 162) recommended extension of this delay for all 
aspects of TRIPS along with flexible interpretation of its 
provisions after the year 2016.  
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